Ha'aretz,
10th December 2003
One-State Awakening
by
Peter Hirschberg
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For almost his entire thinking life, Daniel Gavron has been a Zionist. The first
inkling that he did not belong in the country of his birth, England, came at age
11, at a middle-class boarding school. "Lots of the kids there were the sons of
farmers," he recalls. "They had this very strong link with the land that I felt
I lacked. Once I heard about Zionism, it all seemed to fit. That England was not
my land and that my land was in another place - this country in the Middle
East."
Gavron's bar mitzvah coincided with the creation of the state
in 1948, magnifying a nascent sense that his destiny somehow meshed with that of
the Jewish state. His father asked the guests to donate money to the fledgling
state rather than bring presents.
Gavron got his first taste of the great drama unfolding in the Middle East, of
which he so desperately wanted to be a part, when he arrived in Israel in 1954
as a member of the Habonim youth movement, for the year-long Machon leadership
training program. "Our feeling was that we'd missed it all - the 1930s, building
the kibbutzim, creating Tel Aviv," he says. "We wondered how we were so unlucky
to have missed the pioneering period."
Seven years later, Gavron got the chance to live out that pioneering fantasy.
Shortly after immigrating to Israel with his wife and young son, he joined the
initial wave of settlers who established Arad in the Negev wilderness. "Since
then Israel has been very much home," he says. "It has never been an option for
us to live anywhere else."
He's also been fully prepared to defend that home - in uniform in the Gaza Strip
and the Arava in the 1960s and '70s, and as an emissary abroad. When Jewish
students were desperately battling the fall-out of the United Nations'
Zionism-is-racism resolution on British campuses in the mid-'70s, Gavron was
dispatched by the Jewish Agency to assist in making the case for the embattled
Jewish state.
"They were kicking out Zionist and Jewish societies on British campuses," he
recalls. "I was supposed to be their secret weapon."
He confesses, unabashedly, to a sense of heart-warming national pride after
Israel's swift victory in the Six-Day War, after its rearguard action in the Yom
Kippur War, and when it sent its troops thousands of miles to rescue Jews at
Entebbe. He talks of a connection to the land in romantic, A.D. Gordon-like
terms. Driven by a desire to reacquaint himself with the country's physical
contours and its people, after several years in the Israel Radio English news
department in Jerusalem, he set out to traverse Israel by foot. The result of 31
days of hiking from north to south, over several months, was "Walking Through
Israel," one of seven books he has written.
"It was a kind of Zionist mission," he recalls, often peering into the distance
as he formulates his answers in the spacious garden, shrouded in autumn sun, of
his home in Motza, outside of Jerusalem. "I still belong to a walking group
today, out of a love for Israel."
His role model is veteran Labor Zionist Lova Eliav, whom he first met in Arad.
Gavron, himself, hails from the ideological and cultural heartland of
traditional Labor Zionism. He calls himself a "mainstream, orthodox Labor
Zionist," a member of the elite that shaped the country. What the founding
fathers achieved, he says, "was a massive, huge, gigantic, inspiring
achievement, in which I remain a very modest but a very proud participant."
His own history certainly makes for textbook Zionist reading. But something has
happened to Daniel Gavron. The momentous ideological shift he has experienced
since the start of the intifada is not immediately evident when you read his
latest book, "The Other Side of Despair: Jews and Arabs in the Promised Land" (Rowman
& Littlefield), which appeared in bookshops in mid-November. The first chapter
lays out the historical background to the Middle East conflict, with the next
six providing an engaging, if not novel, attempt to understand the violence
through the deftly woven portraits of 16 Israelis and Palestinians. These
include Eliav, Nasser Eddin Nashashibi, an elder of one of the dominant
Palestinian clans, former finance minister Avraham "Beiga" Shohat, Palestinian
civil rights lawyer Jonathan Kuttab, as well as Palestinian militants, Jewish
settlers, bereaved parents on both sides, and Israel Defense Forces soldiers,
one of whom refused to serve in the territories.
But these chapters contain only a few vague hints of the heretical conclusion -
for a life-long, traditional Zionist, that is - that Gavron has reached and
which he presents to his unsuspecting readers in the book's eighth and final
chapter: After 55 years of Jewish sovereignty, the time has come to dissolve the
Jewish state and establish, in its place, a single Israeli-Palestinian state.
"Having reached the conclusion that the territory between the Mediterranean and
the Jordan River must be shared, but cannot be sensibly partitioned," he writes
in his book, "we are left with only one alternative: Israeli-Palestinian
coexistence in one nation."
The only solution, to his mind, that could preserve the Jewish state - partition
into two states, Israel and Palestine - is no longer tenable. The massive
settlement construction in the West Bank has sealed its fate. If Israeli Jews
now wish to secure their long-term future in the region, he explains, they must
agree to abdicate Jewish sovereignty and move swiftly, while the balance of
power still tilts in their favor, to a multiethnic democracy.
The absence of governmental steadfastness in the face of the settlers'
ideological tenacity, along with the left's lack of clarity, have added to
Gavron's conviction that the land is no longer divisible. "I do not see any
government emerging that would withdraw more than a very minimal number of
settlements," he says. "We haven't even managed to get rid of Netzarim, for
God's sake. I just don't see any elected Israeli government having sufficient
determination and sufficient clarity of vision to carry out the redivision of
Palestine, Israel, the Land of Israel, whatever you want to call it. Friends of
mine sometimes say the Americans will force us into it. They won't. They're not
forcing us into anything ... In a way, I'm saying the settlers have won. That is
profoundly sad. But they have."
The penalty for succumbing to the settlers' single-minded pursuit of Greater
Israel, Gavron writes, is the dissolution of the Jewish state. "Many Israelis,
and other Jews, will argue that historic justice demands a Jewish state. They
will insist that, particularly after centuries of horrendous Jewish suffering
culminating in the Holocaust, there should be one place on Earth where the Jews
can exercise their natural right to sovereignty. They are absolutely right, but,
unfortunately, given the choice between sovereignty and land, we chose land. We
have manifestly preferred settlement in the whole Land of Israel to a state of
Israel in part of the land. It is irrelevant that the settlers are a small
minority. The rest of us have permitted them to do what they wanted."
'A righteous cause'
Gavron is not the first to posit a binational solution to the Mideast conflict.
Judah Magnes did it as early as the 1930s. Now, prompted by the paralysis of yet
another U.S. peace plan and the countdown to Jewish-Arab demographic parity
between the river and the sea, there has also been a profusion of articles
around the world in recent months, reinvoking the one-state solution. But unlike
many of the authors of these articles - anti-Zionist leftists who never accepted
the legitimacy of a Jewish state, and Palestinian intellectuals advising their
leaders to abandon partition for a demand for equal rights in a single state -
Gavron has been a devout, lifelong Jewish nationalist. He still is, by his own
admission.
"A righteous cause," he says, borrowing a phrase from Winston Churchill to
describe the Jewish national movement. "I believe in Zionism. I'm just saying
that Zionism, like everything else, has to adapt itself to reality."
Gavron also goes significantly further than most other writers who eulogize the
two-state solution, or warn of its imminent extinction, offering a working model
for a unitary state. It begins with the immediate annexation by Israel of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, followed by elections based on a universal franchise.
If Israeli Jews don't adopt his model, he warns, the one-state reality will
ultimately be imposed on them - in a slow but savage process.
While the Israeli left has often used the demographic issue as a doomsday weapon
in an effort to convince the public to back a two-state solution, they have
begun doing so with growing urgency in recent months as they see the one-state
scenario looming ever larger. But the demographic fear has also begun to
permeate right-wing thinking. Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert recently told
Haaretz that a growing number of Palestinians "are uninterested in a negotiated,
two-state solution, because they want to change the essence of the conflict from
an Algerian paradigm to a South African one. From a struggle against
`occupation,' in their parlance, to a struggle for one-man-one-vote. That is, of
course, a much cleaner struggle, a much more popular struggle - and ultimately a
much more powerful one. For us, it would mean the end of the Jewish state."
Olmert, along with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, has begun to espouse a
unilateralism that would likely include dismantling settlements. Gavron is
unimpressed, by both the left and right: "Any Israeli government that can
evacuate settlements - like Sharon's - won't want to," he says. "And any Israeli
government that wants to, can't."
He has not suddenly joined the ranks of the far left. In the introduction to his
new book, he is as caustically critical of the Palestinians as he is of Israel.
He calls Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000
"insensitive," but says it was "a pretty feeble excuse for the severity of the
Palestinian demonstrations that followed."
He says the Palestinians initiated the violence and must shoulder much of the
blame. Yasser Arafat, he writes, "showed no manifest desire to calm the
situation," but he dismisses the accusation that the Palestinians never desired
a settlement with Israel and planned the intifada in advance. He also criticizes
the Palestinians "for doing nothing to counter the impression [at Camp David]
that they were rejecting the Israeli suggestions without putting forward
alternative proposals of their own." But, while he lauds Ehud Barak for making a
courageous offer at the summit, he criticizes him for trying to railroad the
Palestinians into accepting it.
He says Amnesty International has rightly described suicide bombings as "war
crimes," but that, at the same time, "it has to be admitted that the fingers of
the Israeli soldiers have been appallingly light on the trigger."
Gavron also hasn't had a sudden attack of post-Zionism. Propagating the end of
the Jewish state does not sit easy with him. "I'm very, very uncomfortable with
it," he says. "I came to the one-state solution very reluctantly. I'm a lifelong
Zionist. But my answer is, I didn't go and settle in Judea and Samaria."
The State of Jerusalem
It was at a parlor meeting on unilateral withdrawal, about a year into the
intifada, that Gavron had his epiphany. "I suddenly realized halfway through,
while I was actually speaking, that I didn't believe what I was saying. I had
come to the conclusion that the two-state solution could not work anymore."
He would still happily accept a two-state model if he could be convinced it
could be implemented. He signed the petition of Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh,
and supports the Geneva Accord of Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo. But, in
his view, these are likely to be among the last failed attempts at a two-state
solution.
Having made the paradigm shift, Gavron now reads history - biblical and Zionist
- in a way that gels with the one-state vision he offers. Ancient history, he
contends, is far more supportive of the idea of a multiethnic society than an
ethnocentric Jewish one. "King David, if the Bible is to be believed, conquered
Jerusalem from the Jebusites and then shared the city with them," Gavron writes.
"He made use of Canaanite officials, had a Hittite general, enjoyed good
relations with the Phoenicians, and (after some bloody conflicts with them)
deployed Philistine units in his army, the Cherethites and Pelethites."
Judea, during the Second Temple period, also had a mixed population. "One can
argue, then, that the establishment of a multicultural nation, rather than a
specifically Jewish state, is a true expression of Zionism in that it is
reconstructing a model similar to the historical entities of ancient Israel and
Judea," he posits.
Gavron even enlists the father of modern Zionism in explaining his shift to
binationalism. In "Altneuland," he says, Herzl describes a political entity with
a Jewish president and Arab vice president.
Having established the historical underpinnings of his new, multiethnic state,
he lays out the steps needed to create it: Israel's annexation of the
territories, accompanied by a pledge of full equality for all residents of the
new, enlarged state, and democratic elections within three months. These, he
estimates, will produce some 40 Arab members in a 120-seat parliament. Drafting
a constitution will be one of its first tasks.
As for the vexing problems that have frustrated all attempts so far to unlock
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - borders, Jerusalem, settlements, the Temple
Mount - they all melt away once sovereignty over the land no longer needs to be
split.
On the issue of citizenship, Gavron offers Jews and Palestinians a trade-off:
Jews will agree to annul the Law of Return and Palestinians will forgo their
insistence on the right of return. Anyone who wants to become a citizen of the
new state will have to undergo a naturalization process akin to that in other
Western countries.
Hebrew, Arabic and English - "the language in which most Israeli-Palestinian
dialogues are held," writes Gavron - can all be official languages. Since Israel
and Palestine will both be mutually unacceptable names for the new country, he
proposes the "state of Jerusalem," "Yerushalayim" in Hebrew, "Ursalim al-Kuds"
in Arabic.
Finally, Gavron suggests a governing structure that would allow maximum ethnic,
religious, cultural and educational autonomy for the communities that will
comprise the state of Jerusalem. "Apart from the Muslim Arabs and the secular
Jews, this autonomy can be granted to communities, such as the ultra-Orthodox
Jews with their special requirements. It will also solve the problems of the
various Christian communities in the country. These include the Arab Christians,
the significant number of Christians who have arrived from the former Soviet
Union in the past decade, and the large community of foreign workers who have
come in the same period."
Nightmare scenario
Gavron, 68, is confident and unambiguous in laying out his vision. "In my book,
I'm saying put up or shut up. If you want a two-state solution, then let's go
ahead and do it."
He is never apologetic, even though he understands that at best, he will be
accused of being naive, at worst vilified for being a traitor by fellow Jews,
now that his ideas have entered the public domain. "I understand the people who
say I'm naive and I even understand the people who say I'm a traitor. But all I
am trying to do is recognize the reality of the situation. We have to adapt the
Jewish national renaissance to the reality of today. The only realistic way to
do this is to transform Israel into something else."
For all the zeal emitted by someone who has undergone a mind-altering
experience, Gavron does occasionally permit himself some self-doubt, usually
tinged with self-deprecatory humor. His ideas, he concedes, are not about to
inspire Israelis to dismantle their state overnight: "I haven't convinced any of
my friends, not even my wife," he laughs.
When a passage from his book is read to him aloud, in which he ambitiously
asserts that if Jews conduct themselves "in a wise manner" in the state of
Jerusalem, then "there is no reason for concern," he admits he may have
overstated the case somewhat. "You have quoted me accurately from the book and
my eyebrows shot up, metaphorically speaking. Of course, there is cause for
concern. I'm exaggerating there. But I do believe that if we conduct ourselves
wisely, we can bring it off."
The vast majority of Israeli Jews are certain to demur, viewing Gavron's ideas
as a recipe for national suicide, not salvation. Many will argue that they live
in a democratic society, enjoy freedom of the press, freedom to say almost
anything they want, and have developed a modern economy and a functioning legal
system. The Palestinians have none of these. Surely, as integration begins to
loom large, those Israelis with a second passport will depart, and those who
don't will be clamoring to get one, fearful it will only be a matter of time
until they come under the rule of a not-so-hospitable Arab majority.
That dark scenario, Gavron argues, will come to pass if Jews resist the
multiethnic solution he proposes and a one-state solution is forced on them
further down the line when the demographic balance has tilted against them. "If
the conflict continues, if we go on bombing them and they go on blowing us up
with suicide bombs, this will escalate ultimately into a situation where the
Arabs will want to kill the Jews, and when there are more of them, it will be
easier for them to do it."
He offers a palliative for these fears: At the outset of the new state, Jews
will be in the majority, with control of parliament, government, the army, the
civil service, the judiciary and other arms of state, and will get to set the
rules. "If we start today, when we are in charge, it is up to us to create a
society in which people want to remain," he says. "There is absolutely no reason
to believe it would degenerate into something inferior. The Palestinians are
often called `the Jews of the Arab world.' They are enterprising, they are
intelligent, they are far more democratic than any other Arabs, they want
democracy."
He concedes that existential fears are legitimate, but insists "not every
Palestinian has the aim in life of slaughtering Jews. If we create a society in
which there are equal rights, democracy, the chance for education and for
creativity and self-expression, there's absolutely no reason why a very
reasonable, enlightened society won't emerge here. I don't see a situation in
which suddenly in 20 years, the Arabs have got 61 members of the Knesset, we've
only got 59, and then they will turn round and slaughter us in our beds."
As for the Jews who want to live in a Jewish state, Gavron believes the
aspirations of Jewish history, religion and culture can all be fulfilled in his
state of Jerusalem. "The Jews will be able to observe their national and
religious festivals in their ancient homeland," he writes. "They will be able to
continue to create their unique Hebrew culture."
By agreeing to annul the Law of Return, Gavron is surrendering one of the
cardinal justifications for the creation of a Jewish state - the need for a safe
haven for Jews. That's because he now looks at the world and no longer sees Jews
in distress as Jews. "With regard to one of the classic Zionist themes of a
refuge for persecuted people, Israel fulfilled its task nobly. I'm deeply proud
of it. But I do not think that at the present time, a refuge specifically for
Jews is needed. It's much more important to get around to solving the problem of
Israel as it exists today. The Argentinean Jews haven't come to Israel because
they're in danger as Jews. They're fleeing from an economic catastrophe. The
Russian Jews and many non-Jews who come here are fleeing from the chaos of
reconstructing the Soviet Union.
"The main force for anti-Jewish feeling today, I don't want to call it
anti-Semitism, is in fact Israel and its actions. The paradox is ... that Israel
is the most dangerous place for Jews today, and also that Israel is endangering
Jews in other countries by its actions, by the tremendously militant policies,
certainly of the last three years, that have caused huge hostility toward Israel
and toward Jews. In that sense Israel, which was a vital haven for the Jews, has
now become a liability to Jews."
Palestinian allies
Unlike Gavron, the Palestinians in his book have not lost faith in a two-state
solution, or at least have not abandoned the idea. "It isn't true that we want
to throw the Jews into the sea," says Abdullah Abu-Hadid, a senior commander of
Fatah in Bethlehem. "I want to establish a Palestinian state inside the 1967
borders. And, believe me, that is what will happen in the end."
Lawyer Jonathan Kuttab tells Gavron the two-state solution is an inferior
formula to one state for both peoples, but is more realistic. "I don't want to
say to the Israelis, `I deny your hopes and dreams, your goals, your ideology,
your legitimacy. If that's what you want, you are entitled to it.' Let there be
a two-state solution. That is a practical and pragmatic compromise."
But Gavron, who heaps most of the blame for the demise of the two-state option
on Israel's settlement policy, does not exonerate the Palestinians. Despite
their demand for an independent state, he writes, "they reacted with something
approaching panic whenever they got close to achieving it."
In 1947, they rejected the UN partition plan; in 1967 they rejected Israel's
willingness to withdraw from the territories in exchange for peace; in 1977 they
"scornfully" turned down Anwar Sadat's invitation to join his peace initiative;
and at Camp David in 2000 they "failed to come up with a counterproposal to
Barak's unprecedented suggestions for a settlement that offered them an
independent state. So, if the Jews have not been sufficiently enthusiastic about
an independent state, the Palestinians have been almost pathological in their
rejection of one."
But maybe Gavron has misread Palestinian intentions. Maybe the Israeli right is
correct - that the culmination of the PLO's strategy is a Palestinian state in
all of historical Palestine. Arafat is, after all, on record for saying "the
womb of the Arab woman is my best weapon."
"I do think that the Palestinian national movement, the Palestinian Authority,
the PLO, were sincere in accepting the idea of a two-state solution," says
Gavron. "There might be an element of truth in the fact that the Palestinians
always had in the back of their minds that their womb would become triumphant.
But what's the answer to that? I don't see myself as trying to win the argument
with the Palestinians. I see myself as trying to get the best possible deal for
the Jewish society, the Jewish Israeli Zionist society that has emerged here. I
believe that with wisdom we can create a society here that is free and
democratic, and ultimately the Palestinian womb would `slow down.' When the
level of education goes up, birthrates go down. It has happened already to an
extent with Israeli Arabs, certainly with Israeli Christian Arabs."
For the Palestinians, the advantage of the state of Jerusalem is that they "gain
immediate access to a relatively modern, free, democratic state," Gavron writes.
"The advantage for the Israelis is that, as the current majority, they get to
set the rules."
He is likely to find more takers on the Palestinian side. In fact, a growing
number of Palestinian intellectuals have begun talking recently of the need to
shift to a one-state model. Waging a struggle for civil liberties in a
binational state, rather than for national self-determination, they argue, will
be far more effective, especially when it comes to world opinion. Some are
already advising Palestinian leaders to set a time frame for negotiating a
two-state settlement with Israel, with the caveat that if it fails, then the two
peoples will meet down the line in a single state.
That thinking has begun to take hold among political leaders, too. Gavron quotes
Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti shouting to reporters in the courtroom at the
start of his trial in August 2002: "Two states for two peoples - that is the
only solution." But just a year later, in closing remarks at his trial,
Barghouti warned Israelis that if they did not relinquish control of the
territories, they would bury the Jewish state. "If an occupation does not end
unilaterally or through negotiations, then there is only one solution: one state
for two peoples," he said.
It is unclear to what extent Barghouti's comments represent a strategic shift in
Palestinian thinking or merely a scare tactic aimed at forcing Israelis to
negotiate a deal before they are overwhelmed by demographics. Gavron, of course,
is undaunted by this prospect, having already accepted what he sees as the
inevitability of the one-state solution. "We shouldn't be afraid of this. We
should meet the challenge and say, `Okay, let's set our constitution in steel' -
this is going to ensure full human rights for everybody. And minority rights as
well, because we might be a minority one day."
Other side of despair?
Having conceded victory to the settlers, Gavron says the battleground has to be
shifted: "I'm saying to the settlers, `Okay, you've won, let's have one state.
But don't tell me we're not going to be democratic. Don't tell me the
Palestinians are going to vote in Jordan any more than the Mexicans vote for the
U.S. Senate.'"
He gives short shrift in his book to another possible solution, a third way to
ensure a long-term Jewish majority - transfer. Amit Segal, one of two
second-generation settlers profiled in the book and the son of journalist and
former Jewish underground member Hagai Segal, tells Gavron that in the event of
peace, "the Palestinians can stay, but if they go on attacking Israelis, there
will be escalating conflict and many of them may be forced out."
If Gavron marvels at the settlers' ideological clarity and conviction, he is
confident they will not succeed in galvanizing enough public support to forcibly
remove a large number of Palestinians from their homes, even if terror
escalates. "The Israeli majority is very woolly minded and insufficiently clear
in its vision, but I don't think it would countenance any sort of large-scale
transfer ... I think also the Palestinians have learned their lesson. In 1948
they were stampeded and panicked. I think this time they're going to dig in and
stay."
For the state of Jerusalem to succeed, it would require a degree of trust and
goodwill that only a star-struck messianic would believe possible after the
bloodletting of the last three years. Gavron himself writes that the violence
has resulted "in irreparable harm to both national psyches."
He is sober about the prospects of his vision. In fact, he expects the violence
to continue and for the two sides to stumble bloodily into a one-state reality.
"My nightmare is that the scenario of the one-state solution is going to happen
the wrong way. We will fence off the Palestinians, continue to clash with them,
they will continue to mount terrorist attacks against us, and we will continue
retaliating. De facto it will become one state, without it being properly
defined or properly envisaged. At a certain stage it will come under the control
of the majority. Then, all the fears people express to me about my ideas will
come true."
The scenario he sees emerging - he's certainly not the first to say it - is
disturbingly similar to the old South Africa, in which a minority Israeli
government rules over an Arab majority bereft of political rights. Israel will
become increasingly isolated, emigration will grow and the economy will worsen.
"What we have here is not apartheid, but there is a danger of it emerging if
something very drastic isn't done ... I think the miracle of Israel was a
greater miracle than the one now required to create what I'm proposing. The
creation of the state was much less likely, much more fraught with danger, and
much harder to achieve. What I'm proposing is simply a switch in thinking and
conception. This is much, much easier to achieve. Whether we are going to do it
is another question. But we can."
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